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Abstract—In device-to-device (D2D)-enabled caching cellular
networks, the user terminals (UTs) collaboratively store and
share a large volume of popular contents from the base station
(BS) for traffic offloading and delivery delay reduction. In
this article, the multi-winner auction based caching placement
in D2D-enabled caching cellular networks is investigated for
UT edge caching incentive and content caching redundancy
reduction. Firstly, a multi-winner once auction for UT edge
caching is modeled which auctions multiple contents for mul-
tiple UTs. Then the optimization problem for content caching
revenue maximization is formulated. Specifically, the “cache
conflict” restriction relationship among UTs is used as one of
the constraints in the problem to reduce the content caching
redundancy in a UT movement scenario. The problem is solved
by semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation to obtain an
approximate optimal caching placement. Moreover, the payment
strategy of the auction is developed as a Nash bargaining game
for personal profit fairness among the UTs who win the auction
for content caching. Subsequently, a multi-winner once auction
based caching (MOAC) placement algorithm is proposed. In
addition, due to the high complexity of MOAC, we further
propose a heuristic multi-winner repeated auction based caching
placement (MRAC) algorithm, which can greatly reduce the
complexity with only tiny performance loss. Simulation results
show that the proposed algorithms can reduce the traffic load
and average content access delay effectively compared with the
existing caching placement algorithms.
Index Terms—Caching placement, device-to-device communi-
cation, edge caching, multi-winner auction
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of mobile network technologies and
the popularization of mobile Internet applications, the mobile
Internet data traffic and the content diversity have grown
explosively recent years. It is predicted that data traffic in the
global mobile cellular network will reach 2 ZB in 2021 [2], of
which 71% of mobile data traffic is used for content distribu-
tion. In order to meet the huge demands for content distribution
in mobile cellular networks, the concept of edge caching
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has been proposed [3, 4]. Edge caching proactively stores hot
contents with high popularity on base stations (BSs) [3], user
terminals (UTs) [4] and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) [5,
6], thereby reducing content acquisition delay and backhaul
link load [7]. However, compared to the massive data contents,
the cache spaces of nodes are limited. Therefore, the caching
placement problem is the key to optimizing performance of
edge caching.
The main idea of UT edge caching in cellular networks
is to store the contents in some UTs by means of prefetch-
ing, and then share the contents among UTs by device-to-
device (D2D) communications [8]. The combination of D2D
communication and UT edge caching can effectively solve
the problem of repeated content reuse during peak hours,
improve the quality of user service, and reduce BS traffic
in the hotspot area, which can be deployed in the campus
of university as a typical application scenarios. The D2D
communications can directly transmit data between UTs in
the vicinity without passing through the BS by using intra-cell
radio resource [9]. D2D communications in cellular networks
can increase network throughput, reduce energy consumption,
and improve spectrum utilization [10–12]. It has been shown
that the throughput of caching cellular networks based on
D2D communications increases linearly with the number of
users [13]. In fact, the caching placement is critical to caching
performance in D2D-enabled caching since the cache space is
limited compared to the large volume of contents. For the
content diversity, one of the targets of the caching placement
is to avoid redundancy and space waste. In [4], a wireless
video storage distribution architecture using D2D in a small
cell has been proposed to improve the video throughput. This
architecture has used cache spaces instead of backhaul links in
the applications with lots of content reuse and selected some
UTs as fixed helper nodes. Based on the similar idea, the
caching algorithm in [14] assigns a part of the UTs as caching-
server devices. In [15], a series of users willing to cache the
same content are selected as the initial seeds according to their
online influences and offline movements. Some works select
the helper nodes in the UTs according to their relationship in
advance [4, 14, 15]. However, the existing works only consider
factors such as distance, interest similarity, or influence among
users. The selected helper nodes are fixed and lack specificity
for different contents. In [16], the UTs in the same cluster
cache different contents. But this approach cannot guarantee
global optimality. In [17], a user preference aware caching
deployment algorithm is proposed for D2D-enabled cellular
networks with a constraint of one content can only saved in
2one UT in its coverage region. In [18], the large-scale opti-
mization and framework design of hierarchical edge caching
are addressed which considers the analysis of social behavior
and preference of mobile users, heterogeneous cache sizes, and
the derived system topology in D2D-enabled cellular networks.
Besides, the above studies ignore the selfishness of UTs by
assuming all UTs voluntarily participate in the content caching
and sharing. In practical applications, such as video sharing,
news subscription, etc., content sharing among UTs through
D2D communications needs more convincing reasons. Lack of
incentives may prevent UTs to perform D2D communications.
Various incentive mechanisms have been designed for edge
caching in cellular networks [1, 19]. Recently, there have been
studies for caching placement based on auction theory or
game theory in BS edge caching [20–23]. A Vickrey-Clark-
Groves (VCG) auction mechanism has been proposed in [20]
to maximize social welfare. This mechanism enables multiple
wireless service providers (WPSs) to exchange cooperation
buffers for bandwidth resources through the auction of server
bandwidth. A multi-target auction has been designed in [21],
where operators would bid for storage space for their own
content. An auction algorithm is used in [22] to determine the
amount of contents cached by the BSs. In [23], stackelberg
game for BS edge caching is designed for 5G networks with
a large number of BSs and UTs. For UE edge caching in
D2D-enabled cellular networks, incentive mechanisms have
been proposed for UTs participating in the caching placement
process. Most of those research contributions are based on
social relationships among UTs to enhance D2D communi-
cations [24–26]. The caching scheme in [24] simultaneously
enhances the participation of BSs and UTs by incentives,
which utilizes game theory to maximize the revenue of UTs
while minimize the cost of BSs. Some works have considered
both content caching redundancy issues and user selfishness
issues [25, 26]. Social ties are used in [25] to promote effective
cooperation among UTs. Social-aware caching game has been
proposed in [26] to incentivize UTs to cache data for others.
Big data and artificial intelligence have been used for edge
caching and D2D communication [27–29]. The potential of
disseminating contents among mobile users assisted by the
integration of big data techniques is discussed in [27], but does
not involve a specific caching placement strategy. A distributed
cache replacement strategy based on Q-learning at the BS has
proposed in [28]. Joint optimization of computation, caching,
and communication on the edge cloud has been proposed
in [29]. However, both of them discuss the BS edge caching
instead of UT edge caching we studies in the paper.
A. Motivation and Contribution
As mentioned above, the user selfishness problem and con-
tent caching redundancy should be considered in the caching
placement design in D2D-enabled caching cellular networks.
However, some studies on caching placement overlook user
selfishness. Even if user selfishness is considered in some
works, the differences between various contents and the impact
of user mobility are ignored. In this paper, we consider both
issues on UT edge caching in D2D-enabled caching cellular
networks. We model the UT edge caching as a multi-winner
once auction process, based on which we use the natural so-
cial efficiency and individual rationality characteristics of the
auction mechanism to solve the problem of user selfishness.
By maximizing the content caching revenue of all the UTs
in the cell, we develop a caching placement algorithm to
cache different contents in different winner UT sets. Different
from the prior helper nodes selection and clustering method,
the UT sets are formed by the “cache conflict” restriction
relationship, which can reduce the content cache redundancy
in the UT movement scenario. We design a content caching
revenue function that considers content preferences, restriction
relationships, and cache space costs of UTs. The proposed
caching placement algorithm can effectively reduce the traffic
load of the BS and average content access delay of the UTs,
thereby improving the service experience of the UTs. The main
contribution of this paper is summarized as follows,
• We propose a multi-winner once auction of UT edge
caching to incentivize the UTs participating content
caching and sharing. Since there are multiple content
chunks to be proactive cached in multiple UTs simultane-
ously at off-peak hours in practical application, the multi-
ple content chunks regarded as products are auctioned to
multiple UTs at one time in our proposed auction model.
• We develop a caching placement optimization problem
to maximize the content sharing revenue of all the UTs.
Specifically, we utilize the “cache conflict” restriction
relationship of UTs as one of the constraints in this
problem to reduce the content cache redundancy in the
UT movement scenario. We solve the formulated prob-
lem by semidefinite programming (SDP) relaxation and
propose a corresponding multi-winner once auction based
caching (MOAC) placement algorithm. Then we propose
the pricing and payment strategy of the winner UT set for
the auction. The payment is modeled as a Nash bargaining
game, and the price paid to the content of each UT in
the winner UT set is a Nash bargaining solution that can
guarantee the fairness of personal profit of each UT.
• We propose a low-complexity multi-winner repeated auc-
tion caching (MRAC) placement algorithm to reduce the
complexity of the MOAC. The MRAC sorts the content
chunks according to their popularity, and then performs
multi-winner auctions for different content chunks in
sequence, which enable near-optimal caching placement,
but greatly reduces complexity.
• We explore the impact of the encounter probability
threshold on the performance of the proposed MOAC and
MRAC algorithms, and analyzed the statistical character-
istics of the encounter probability and the choice of its
threshold. We demonstrate that the proposed algorithms
are capable of achieving a near-optimal performance.
Moreover, the MOAC and MRAC algorithms outperform
the conventional caching placement schemes in terms of
BS traffic offloading and content access delay under the
appropriate threshold.
B. Organization and Notations
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, D2D-enabled caching cellular networks considering UT
3mobility is introduced. The MOAC placement algorithm is
presented in Section III. The MORC placement algorithm
is addressed in Section IV. Simulation results are shown in
Section V and conclusions are finally drawn in Section VI. The
main symbols and variables used in this paper are summarized
in Table I.
TABLE I: Main Symbol and Variable List
Parameter Description
M total number of content chunks in one macrocell
N total number of UTs in one macrocell
v
(m)
n the content caching and sharing revenue of UT
n for content chunk m
b
(m)
n the bid of UT n for content chunk m
p
(m)
n the price that winner UT n needs to pay for
content chunk m
p(m) p(m) =
[
p
(m)
1 , p
(m)
2 , ..., p
(m)
N
]
x
(m)
n x
(m)
n = 1 represents UT n caching the content
chunk m
x(m) x(m) =
[
x
(m)
1 , x
(m)
2 , ..., x
(m)
N
]
en,n′ encounter probability between UT n and n
′
E UT “cache conflict” restriction matrix
γ encounter probability threshold
Nn the neighboring UT set of UT n
w
(m)
n the content sharing profit of UT n for content
chunk m
f
(m)
n preference of UT n for content chunk m
χ χ=
[
x(1),x(2), ...,x(M)
]
υ υ = [v(1),v(2), ...v(M)]
N (m) the winner set for content chunk m
W the winner sets include all content chunks
Fm local popularity of content chunk m
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Cellular Networks
The D2D-enabled caching cellular networks considered in
this paper are shown in Fig. 1, there is one cell with one
macro BS and a set of UTs, N= {1, 2, ..., N}. It is assumed
that multiple UTs are randomly distributed within the coverage
of the BS. The UTs can communicate with each other by
D2D communication links. In this article, we assume that the
content-oriented information management function, including
content naming and caching placement/replacement decision
is embedded in the macro BS in each cell, so we focus on the
caching placement in one cell. In fact, the proposed algorithms
is can be extended to multiple cells scenario directly if the
management function is executed by a central baseband unit
(BBU) in a cloud RAN (CRAN) architecture.
It is assumed that the cellular transmissions and D2D
transmission are assigned non-overlapping orthogonal radio
resource, which is referred to as orthogonal mode or an
overlay mode. The system bandwidth of downlink cellular
transmissions is BC and the system bandwidth of downlink
D2D transmission is BD . We use the equal radio resource
allocation for both the cellular UTs and the D2D UTs.
When UT n′ is communicating with UT n for content
delivery, the data rate from UT n′ to UT n in time slot t
is
rn,n′ (t) =
BD
ND
log
(
1 +
gn′,n (t)P
tx
n′
ID (t) + σ2
)
; (1)
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Fig. 1: D2D-enabled caching cellular networks.
when the BS is communicating with UT n for content delivery,
the data rate from its serving BS to UT n in time slot t is
rn,BS (t) =
BC
NC
log
(
1 +
gBS,n (t)P
tx
BS
IC (t) + σ2
)
, (2)
where σ2 is additive white Gaussian noise power, NC is the
number of cellular UTs receiving data from BS, ND is the
number of D2D communication UT pairs, P txn′ and P
tx
BS is the
maximum transmit power of UT n′ and the maximum transmit
power of BS, gn′,n (t) and gBS,n (t) are the channel gains
between UT n′ and UT n and between BS and UT n in time
slot t, IC (t) and ID (t) are co-channel interference levels from
adjacent cells in time slot t by cellular communications and
D2D communications, respectively. The inter-cell interference
coordination by power allocation and channel scheduling in
D2D cellular networks can improve the system performance,
as shown in [30, 31]. Since we focus on the caching placement,
the interference coordination is out of the scope of this paper.
It is noted that, the proposed caching placement algorithms
can be used in a D2D communication system working in the
non-orthogonal mode (underlay mode), which means that the
cellular transmissions and D2D transmission share the same
radio resources. However, D2D communications in the non-
orthogonal mode suffer strong interference among cellular UTs
and D2D UTs, which can be solved by nonorthogonal multiple
access (NOMA) techniques [32, 33].
B. Caching Model
In the mobile networks, we assume that each content file is
divided into several unified chunks, which is the minimal unit
of data to be transferred over the network. We set the size of
each content chunk is s. It means that different content files
with various data size can be divided into various chunks.
We assume that each cell can cache a set of content chunks
M= {1, 2, ...,M}. Since the UTs caching spaces are limited,
we assume that each UT can only store a fewer number of
content chunks, the cache space of a UT is s0.
In our caching model, a mobile user can be a content
requester and a content provider, as shown in Fig. 1. In the
caching placement process, we assume that the cached files are
popular audio and video contents whose popularity changes
are much slower than the UTs movement, i.e. the content
popularity is invariant during the UTs movement. If UT n
caches the chunk m, x
(m)
n = 1; x
(m)
n = 0 otherwise. If there
exists a complete copy of content chunk m in its own cache,
the request is fulfilled with no delay and without the need to
4establish a communication link. Otherwise, the UT broadcasts
a request message for chunk m to the neighbor UTs. If the
UT can find the requested chunk from a UT’s cache space
within its D2D transmission range, then it will establish a
D2D communication link and obtain the chunk. If the UT
cannot find the requested chunk neither in its own cache nor
its proximity UTs, it will access to BS to acquire this chunk.
Since one file is divided into multiple chunks, one UT can
acquire the requested file from multiple adjacent UTs and BS.
C. Mobility Model
We study the caching placement problem when UTs are
moving within a fixed area, such as a university campus, a
residential area, and so on. In order to reduce the impact of
UTs mobility on system performance, the caching placement
is designed based on the encounter probabilities between UTs.
We use the clustered random model [34] to model the
mobility of UTs. We assume that each UT has a home-point,
and most of its activities are near this point. The home-point
can be the UTs’ dormitory or workplace. We assume that
a UT moves around its home-point according to a general
ergodic process. This UT movement process will result into
a rotationally-invariant spatial distribution φ (d) which decays
with the distance d between the UT and its home-point. For a
given two points X1 and X2 within the coverage of a BS of
radius R, the distance d between them is defined as,
d (X1, X2) = min
u.v∈{−R,0,R}
√
(x1 + u− x2)2 + (y1 + v − y2)2.
(3)
In clustered random model, we define function s (d) =
min
(
1, d−δ
)
to avoid convergence problems in proximity of
the home-point, and normalize it so as to obtain a proper prob-
ability density function over the network area ON : φ (d) =
s(d)∫ ∫
ON
s(d)
. The normalization constant G (n) =
∫ ∫
ON
s (d)
can be approximated in polar coordinates
G (n) = Θ
(∫ 2pi
0
dθ
∫ R
0
min
(
1, ρ−δ
)
ρ dρ
)
.1 (4)
The average distance between the UT and its home-point can
be approximated by
E [d] = Θ
(
1
G (n)
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
∫ R
0
min
(
1, ρ−δ
)
ρ
2dρ
)
. (5)
Parameter δ accounts for the fact that an individual node
does not visit uniformly the network area, but spends most
of the time just in a limited portion of it. In clustered random
model, We assume that there are several clusters with high
density of home-points in the network area, such as school
buildings and dormitory buildings on campus. Each cluster
has a middle point that is uniformly located within ON . The
home-point of each UT is considered to belong to one of the
clusters. Considering the reality, the home-points of some UTs
may coincide. The home-points of the same cluster are then
uniformly and independently placed within a disk of radius
R′ (R′ < R) centered at the cluster middle point.
1Given two functions f (n) ≥ 0 and g (n) ≥ 0: f (n) = O (g (n))
means lim supn→∞f (n) /g (n) = c < ∞; f (n) = Θ(g (n)) means
f (n) = O (g (n)) and g (n) = O (f (n)).
Based on such mobility model, we denote en,n′ as the
probability of the encounter between UT n and n′ in a given
area, which is a known statistical result in a certain duration,
such as T time slots. In time slot t, UT n encounters UT n′
means UT n is in the D2D communication area of UT n′,
that is, the received signal power of the D2D communication
between n and n′ is greater than a minimum received signal
power levelK . We denote cn,n′ (t) = 1 if UT n encounters UT
n′ in time slot t; otherwise cn,n′ (t) = 0. Then the encounter
probability of UT n and n′ during T time slots is,
en,n′ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
cn,n′ (t), (6)
where 0 ≤ en,n′ ≤ 1. The larger en,n′ is, the higher the
probability that n and n′ can share contents through D2D
communication.
III. MULTI-WINNER ONCE AUCTION BASED CACHING
PLACEMENT
In this section, the multi-winner once auction of UT edge
caching is modeled first. Based on this auction model, the
caching placement problem is formulated and its approximate
optimal solution is obtained, then the pricing and payment
strategy of this auction is given.
A. Multi-Winner Auction Model
In order to motivate UTs for content caching and sharing,
the caching placement at UTs is modeled as an auction
process. In our content auction model, the buyers (bidders)
are the UTs, the seller is the BS, the auction products are the
content chunks. There are three basic principles need to be
met when designing an auction mechanism:
• social efficiency: the social welfare of all participants is
maximized;
• individual rationality: the revenue of each participant is
larger than or equal to zero;
• truthfulness: the auction mechanism should ensure that
the buyers bid for the auction products is equal to the
products’ actual value.
In this paper, we consider the revenue of all the UTs as
social welfare, so the social efficiency can be ensured by
maximizing the sum revenue of UTs. We assume that only
when the UT’s revenue for caching a content chunk is greater
than 0, this UT will participate in the auction of this content
chunk. This assumption is feasible in practical scenario and is
in line with individual rationality of each UT.
There are many common auction models that can guarantee
truthfulness, including VCG auction models and second-price
sealed bid auction models. The existing auction research on
spectrum access shows that VCG auctions are not conducive
to cooperation and may result in lower returns [35]. Therefore,
we apply the second-price sealed bid auction in this paper.
The second-price sealed bid auction, also known as the
Vickery auction, has three characteristics as follows:
• the bidders cannot know (at least when bidding) the bids
of other bidders;
• the bidders only bid once;
5• the highest bidder wins, and the winner pays the second
highest bid.
The advantage of the second-price sealed bid auction is that
it can guarantee the truthfulness of bidders’ bids because the
winner’s payment is not determined by themselves but by the
second highest loser. The level of the bid only determines the
winning or losing but does not determine the specific price.
From [36], we can see that only bidding with real values is the
best strategy, which can maximally ensure the bidders profit.
Considering individual rationality and truthfulness, the basic
auction model we use is the second-price sealed bid auction.
However, the typical mode of the traditional second-price
sealed bid auction is the single winner auction. In our caching
model, we assume that the same content chunk can be cached
in multiple UTs. In doing so, we propose a multi-winner
once auction (MOA) model based on second-price sealed bid
auction, which achieves multiple winners by once auction for
different UTs caching the same content chunk.
In the proposed MOA model for content caching and
sharing, the revenue of UT n for caching content chunk m
is v
(m)
n , the bid of UT n for content chunk m is b
(m)
n , and
the winner UT n needs to pay p
(m)
n for the content chunk m.
As mentioned above, we consider that b
(m)
n = v
(m)
n because
the second-price sealed bid auction model can guarantee the
truthfulness of the bidders. The UTs win the same content
form a winner UT set and each set can be viewed as one
bidder. By doing so, the process of a multi-winner auction
can be converted to a single-winner auction. There is a
predefined “cache conflict” restriction relationship of UTs
participating in the auction process. The winner is the set
of UTs with the highest total bid without “cache conflicts”.
There are M winner UT sets for M content chunks, which
means the M content chunks are cached in the M winner
UT sets, then the caching placement vectors are denoted as
x(1), x(2), ..., x(M). Correspondingly, there are M payment
price vectors p(1), p(2), ..., p(M). For the caching place-
ment, the main work in this proposed MOA determines two
parts:
1) the set of winners by the social welfare maximization of
all participants to obtain the optimal caching placement.
2) the price that UTs in the winner set need to pay,
respectively, and get the pricing payment strategy.
B. Problem Formulation of Caching Placement
The purpose of caching placement in D2D cellular networks
is to reduce the BS traffic load in peak hours and reduce the
content access delay of mobile users. In doing so, we should
cache as many contents as possible and take full advantage of
the D2D communications for content delivery.
First, we define the “cache conflict” restriction relationship
of UTs to improve the cache utility by avoiding caching same
contents repeatedly on multiple proximal UTs. The defined
“cache conflict” restriction relationship of UTs is decided by
the encounter probabilities of UTs since the mobile users may
move frequently in a certain resident area or university cam-
pus, in the practical scenario. When the encounter probability
of two UTs is large, the content sharing can be achieved by
D2D communication between these two UTs. In such case,
caching the same content in these two UTs leads a waste of
the cache space and diminishes the content diversity in the
networks. So we define a “cache conflict” restriction of UTs
to avoid the waste of the cache space.
The “cache conflict” restriction matrix is defined as E =
{En,n′}, where En,n′ = 1 when the encounter probability of
UT n and UT n′, en,n′ , is larger than a predefined encounter
probability threshold γ, i.e., en,n′ > γ. Otherwise, En,n′ = 0.
The “cache conflict” restriction relationship of UTs is, the UT
n and UT n′ cannot cache the same content when En,n′ = 1,
that is,
x(m)n + x
(m)
n′ ≤ 1, if En,n′ = 1. (7)
UT n′ is regards as a neighbor of UT n when En,n′ = 1. The
neighboring UT set of UT n is denoted as Nn. In practical
scenarios, the predefined encounter probability threshold, γ,
can be obtained from the statistical data of the encounter
probability of UTs. We will verify the impact of γ on the per-
formance of caching placement by simulation in Section V.B.
From the definition of the “cache conflict”, γ determines the
sparseness of matrix E. When γ = 1, E is a zero matrix,
which means that there is no “cache conflict” between the
UTs. When γ = 0, almost all elements in E are equal to 1,
which means the “cache conflict” condition between UTs is
very strict, that is, for each content chunk, it can be cached
by only one UT in the cell.
The revenue of UT n for content chunk m is defined as
v(m)n = w
(m)
n − ζcn, (8)
where w
(m)
n denotes the content sharing profit of UT n for
content chunk m, cn denotes the occupied cache space by
content chunk m in UT n, and ζ denotes the cost of the unit
cache space. The revenue vectors for different content chunks
are defined as v(1), v(2), ..., v(M). The content sharing profit
of UT n by D2D transmission in its neighboring UT set Nn
is defined as
w(m)n = ϑs
∑
n′∈Nn
f
(m)
n′ r¯n,n′en,n′ , (9)
where f
(m)
n′ denotes the preference of UT n
′ for content chunk
m, and r¯n,n′ =
1
T
T∑
t=1
rn,n′ (t). r¯n,n′ denotes the average
transmission rate between UT n and n′, en,n′ denotes the
encounter probability of UT n and n′, and ϑ denotes the
transmission cost of unit bit content.
Remark 1. The larger revenue means that the contents have
a larger opportunity to be delivered by D2D communications.
Therefore maximizing total revenue of all UTs means selecting
the set of UTs with the highest encounter probabilities and
the highest average transmission rate for content caching and
sharing, which can effectively utilize D2D communication to
reduce the traffic load of BS and content access delay of UTs.
According to the proposed MOA model, the caching place-
ment vectors, x(1), x(2), ..., x(M), can be obtained via once
auction by maximizing the social welfare of all the UTs, which
6is formulated as follows:
U∗ = max
x(1),x(2),...,x(M)
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
v(m)n x
(m)
n (10a)
s.t. x(m)n + x
(m)
n′ ≤ 1, ∀n, n′ if En,n′ = 1, ∀m, (10b)
M∑
m=1
x(m)n s ≤ s0, ∀n, (10c)
x(m)n = {0, 1} , n ∈ N , m ∈M, (10d)
where (10b) denotes the “cache conflict” restrict relationship
of UT n and UT n′, (10c) constrains that the cached content
chunks in a UT cannot exceed its cache space s0, and (10d)
constrains that x
(m)
n is a binary variable. By solving this
problem to maximum total revenue of all UTs for content
caching and sharing, we obtain the optimal caching placement
x(1), x(2), ..., x(M) and winner sets for different content
chunks N (1), N (2), ..., N (M).
In generally, the cache space of a UT is limited, so it can
only cache a few content chunks, as indicated in [37]. In
this paper, for simplicity but without loss of generality, it is
assumed that one UT can cache one content chunk with a
size of s. If a UT has cache space more than one chunk, it is
equivalent to multiple UTs with a unified cache space size s.
However, the problem (10) is a maximal weighted indepen-
dent set (MWIS) problem in graph theory. As the core issue in
the NP-complete class of problems, its simplest case with all
v
(m)
n = 1 has been proved to be NP-complete in [38]. Except
for some special cases, such as when the graph is perfect (the
problems involved in this paper are not such special cases), the
complexity of MWIS is in general very high. Therefore, we
need to find an approximate optimal solution of problem (10).
C. Approximate Optimal Solution of Caching Placement
In order to simplify problem (10), we regard the op-
timization problem of M content chunks and N UTs as
the optimization problem of one content chunk (M = 1)
and MN UTs participating. For this purpose, we introduce
two auxiliary variables χ=
[
x(1), x(2), ..., x(M)
]
, and υ =
[v(1), v(2), ..., v(M)], then the problem (10) can be expressed
equivalently as follows:
U∗ = max
χ
MN∑
n=1
υnχn, (11a)
s.t. χn + χn′ ≤ 1, ∀n, n′ if Ξn,n′ = 1, (11b)
χn = {0, 1} , n = 1, 2, ..., MN, (11c)
where
Ξ
∆
=


E I · · · I
I E · · · I
.
..
.
..
. . .
.
..
I I · · · E


MN×MN
(12)
is the expanded “cache conflict” matrix of theMN UTs based
on E, and I denotes the identity matrix.
The following lemma, proved in Appendix A, can simplify
the problem (11) further.
Lemma 1. Define µ = [
√
υ1,
√
υ2, ...,
√
υMN ]
T , y =[
c
√
υ1χ1, c
√
υ2χ2, ..., c
√
υMNχMN
]
, c is the normaliza-
tion constant. Then the optimization problem (11) can be
equivalent to the following optimization problem,
U˜∗ = max
y
(
µTy
)2
, (13a)
s.t. ynyn′ = 0, ∀n, n′ if En,n′ = 1, (13b)
|y|2 = 1. (13c)
The optimal solution y∗ is derived from the form of y∗ =
c
√
υnχ
∗
n.
From the Lemma 1, the optimization problem in (13) is
no longer an integer programming problem, nevertheless, this
problem is still non-trivial as its feasible domain is non-
convex. Then we use the SDP relaxation method to solve,
that is, by removing certain constraints, the feasible set of the
problem is converted into a positive semi-definite matrix cone.
Assume S = yyT, i.e., Sn,n′ = ynyn′ , then objective
function in (13) can be converted to µTv Sµv and the two
constraints are respectively equivalent to Snn′= 0, ∀n, n′
if Ξnn′= 1 and tr (S) = 1. Because S = yy
T and y
is a matrix with dimension N × 1, we can consider that{
S ∈ ζMN |S ≻= O, rank(S) = 1}, where ζMN denotes the
set of MN × MN real symmetric matrixes, and S ≻= O
means S is positive semi-definite. Then we perform SDP
relaxation on (13) by removing condition rank(S) = 1, and
get
θ (Ξ, v) = max
S≻=O
µTv Sµv (14a)
s.t. tr (S) = 1, (14b)
Snn′= 0,∀n, n′ if Ξnn′= 1, (14c)
which is a typical representation of the Lovsz number [39] in
the graph theory.
By solving (14), we can obtain the optimal S∗. If S∗nn 6= 0,
then χ∗n = 1, and then check whether the “cache conflict”
restriction relationship of UTs in the same winner set meets
the requirements. After multiple rounds of calculations, S∗
may not be strictly equal to 0. At this time, a sufficiently
small threshold can be set, such as 10−5, and S∗nn that is less
than this threshold is very close to 0. Finally, we decompose
χ∗ into caching placement for different content chunks and get
x(1), x(2), ..., x(M) and winner sets N (1), N (2), ..., N (M).
D. Pricing and Payment Strategy
In the proposed multi-winner once auction model, the UTs
in each set can be viewed as one bidder and the winner
set is a set of UTs with the highest total bids. Hence, the
pricing strategy of the proposed auction can be obtained using
the same way as the pricing strategy of second-price sealed
bid auction. According to the second-price sealed bid auction
mechanism, the pricing process of MOA is as follows:
1) First, the problem (10) is solved to get the winner sets,
W = ∪Mm=1N (m), that includes all content chunks.
2) The winner sets,W , are removed from the buyer set, and
content chunk m is auctioned again in the remaining loser set,
Nˆ = N\W , from which, we can calculate the maximum total
7actual revenue from (10), denoted U
(m)∗
−W , for the winner set
N (m). In our pricing payment strategy, U (m)∗−W is set as the
total price that the winners of content chunk m need to pay
to the BS.
3) Then we propose a Nash bargaining solution (NBS) based
payment strategy to determine the price p
(m)
n for each UT in
the winner set N (m) to cache the content chunk m.
The goal of the proposed payment strategy in this paper is
to balance the personal benefit of each UT in the winner set
N (m) as much as possible when the total price is equal to
U
(m)∗
−W . We model the payment strategy as Nash bargaining
game to allocate the price to be paid as evenly as possible
in the winner set under the condition of guaranteeing their
revenue. Nash bargaining game, as a cooperative game theory,
is a popular strategy for fairly distributing resources among
competing players [40]. In the game, the players are UTs in the
winner set N (m) and player n, n ∈ N (m), requires a minimal
payoff p
(m)
n to pay for content chunk m with a constraint∑
n∈N (m)
p
(m)
n = U
(m)∗
−W . Since v
(m)
n has been known after the
auction, the Nash bargaining problem can be formulated as
max
p
(m)
n
∏
n∈N (m)
(
v(m)n − p(m)n
)
(15a)
s.t.
∑
n∈N (m)
p(m)n = U
(m)∗
−W , (15b)
0 ≤ p(m)n ≤ v(m)n . (15c)
Denote q
(m)
n = v
(m)
n − p(m)n , and ∑
n∈N (m)
v
(m)
n = U (m)
∗
,
then the problem (15) is equivalent to
min
q
(m)
n
−
∑
n∈N (m)
ln q(m)n (16a)
s.t.
∑
n∈N (m)
q(m)n = U
(m)∗ − U (m)∗−W , (16b)
0 ≤ p(m)n ≤ v(m)n . (16c)
According to [41], when p
(m)
n is a concave upper-bounded
function with convex support, there exists a unique and optimal
NBS. By solving (16) for the KKT conditions, we can get the
price p
(m)
n of UT n in the winner set N (m) that needs to pay
to the BS.
Compared to the traditional VCG auction that may result
in a low or even zero revenue in certain circumstances, the
revenue of UTs in the proposed auction model is more assured
so the UTs are motivated to participate in the auction. At the
same time, if the losers want to defeat the winners by lying,
they will need to bid more than U
(m)∗
−W . Since the price for
winning the auction of the contents is greater than the actual
value of the content for the losers, the losers will have no
incentive to lie, thereby eliminating the possibility of collusion
between the UTs. However, as long as there is a manageable
gap between the price of a winner and the bid of losers, there
is still the possibility that the winner will sublease the content
chunk to the losers. In the event of a sublease, the obtained
caching placement will no longer be the best strategy and will
cause losses for caching performance. Therefore, we need to
further to avoid the occurrence of sub-leasing in (16).
We assume that some of the UTs in the winner set
N˜ (m) sublease their content chunks to the losers L˜(m),
where N˜ (m) ⊆ N (m), L˜(m) ⊆ Nˆ . From the above auc-
tion and pricing process, we can see that sub-leasing can
only occur when the sub-lease price is higher than the
price paid by some of the winners and lower than the
price of some of the losers. The necessary prerequisite for
sub-leasing is
∑
n∈N˜ (m)
p
(m)
n <
∑
n∈L˜(m)
v
(m)
n . As long as this
premise is avoided, sub-leasing will not happen. It should
be noted that potential sub-leasing UTs can only success-
fully lease content chunks when there is no cache conflict
among UTs in the winner set. We define L(m) ∆= {n ∈
Nˆ |Enn′ = 0, ∀n′ ∈ N (m)\N˜ (m)} to denote these UTs, then
there should be
∑
n∈N˜ (m)
p
(m)
n ≥ max
L˜(m)⊆L(m)
∑
n∈L(m)′
v
(m)
n , where
max
L˜(m)⊆L(m)
∑
n∈L˜(m)
v
(m)
n is the maximum social welfare U∗L(m)
in UT set L˜(m), which is obtained by re-auctioning content
chunk m. Therefore, we should restrict (15) as
max
p
(m)
n
∏
n∈N (m)
(
v(m)n − p(m)n
)
(17a)
s.t.
∑
n∈N˜ (m)
p(m)n ≥ U (m)∗L(m) , ∀N˜ (m) ∈ N (m) (17b)
0 ≤ p(m)n ≤ v(m)n . (17c)
When N˜ (m) = N (m), the constraint is ∑
n∈N (m)
p
(m)
n ≥ U∗−W ,
which means the constraint in (15) is a special case in (17). In
addition to the case of N˜ (m) = ∅, whereN (m) has 2|N (m)|−1
subsets. To finally determine the constraints, it is necessary to
calculate the maximum social welfare for the optimal caching
placement of these subsets.
The process of MOA based caching (MOAC) placement
algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MOAC algorithm
1: - Step 1: Initialization
2: Calculate the content sharing profit of content chunk m for
UT n v
(m)
n (m ∈ [1,M ], n ∈ [1, N ]) through (8) to obtain υ =
[v(1), v(2), ..., v(M)];
3: Initial µ = [
√
υ1,
√
υ2, ...,
√
υMN ]
T , y =
[c
√
υ1χ1, c
√
υ2χ2, ..., c
√
υMNχMN ], S = yy
T, and Ξ
in (11);
4: - Step 2: Determine the caching placement
5: Solve the problem (14), get S∗;
6: If S∗nn 6= 0, χ∗n = 1, get χ∗;
7: Decompose χ∗ into caching placement for different content
chunks, get χ=
[
x(1),x(2), ..., x(M)
]
and winner sets W =
∪Mm=1N (m);
8: - Step 3: Pricing and payment strategy
9: Solve problem (16) for content chunk m (m ∈ [1,M ]) to obtain
price P =
[
p(1), p(2), ..., p(M)
]T
;
10: - Step 4: End of the algorithm
8E. Discussions
In this part, we discuss the optimality, convergence, com-
plexity and scalability of the proposed MOAC. Besides, we
summarize that the MOAC satisfy the three auction principles
mentioned in the proposed auction model.
1) Optimality: Since we relax the original optimization
problem by removing the condition rank(S) = 1 to obtain
the approximate optimal solution of caching placement, prob-
lem (14) provides an upper bound for original optimization
problem (10). As one of the constraints, the rank of matrix E
will have an influence on the rank of solved matrix S, which
in turn affects the optimality of the SDP relaxation. The rank
of matrix E is related to the value of γ. When γ is close to
the limit value of 1 or 0, the rank of E is small, so that the
influence of E on the optimality of SDP is very small. In this
case, we can almost obtain the optimal solution. Conversely,
when other value of γ is given, the SDP relaxation obtains
the upper bound of original optimization with a larger rank
of matrix E. In such case, there is a tiny performance gap
between the optimal solution and the relaxed solution.
Remark 2. If the optimal solution S∗ can be decomposed into
S∗ = y∗(y∗)T , it means that S∗ is in the feasible set of the
original optimization problem; otherwise, θ (Ξ, v) is the upper
bound that the original optimization problem cannot reach.
Nevertheless, based on our simulation results in Section IV,
the relaxed approximate optimization problem has more than
99% of possible solutions in the feasible set.
2) Convergence: We use the primal-dual interior point
method to solve the SDP problem in (14). Studies have shown
that the primal-dual interior point method [42] is one of
the most effective algorithms for solving SDP problem. This
algorithm has good convergence and can guarantee accurate
and optimal solutions. We ensure that the relative gap between
the primal and the dual solution is less than 1.49×10−8 in our
simulation. The convergence speed of the algorithm is related
to the complexity determined by the degree of freedom of the
matrix S.
3) Complexity: Since we regard the optimization problem
as an once-auction with MN bidders (UTs) participating,
we need to optimize the problem (14) over S ∈ ζMN , which
has 12MN (MN + 1) degrees of freedom. The computational
complexity of MOAC is O(M2N2), which mean that the
calculation time of the MOAC will increase significantly as
the number of content chunks increases.
4) Scalability: In our caching model, we assume that each
UT can cache one content chunk with size of s. In fact,
the proposed auction model and MOAC algorithm can be
generalized as UT n caching hn content chunks with cache
store size of hns. In this case, UT n will be regarded as hn
UTs, and the bidder set in the auction can be extended as N¯ =
{n¯|n¯ ∈ Nn, n ∈ N}, where Nn = {n1, n2, ..., nhn |n ∈ N}.
Correspondingly, the caching placement can be obtained via
problem (10) in the new bidder set N¯ .
5) Auction Properties: Since we consider the revenue of
all the UTs as social welfare, so the social efficiency can be
ensured in (10). At the same time, only when the UT’s revenue
for caching a chunk is greater than 0, it will participate in the
auction. This assumption is in line with individual rationality
of each UT. Finally, the second-price sealed bid auction we
discuss in the pricing payment strategy can guarantee the
MOAC’s truthfulness.
IV. MULTI-WINNER REPEATED AUCTION BASED
CACHING PLACEMENT
In the practical cellular networks, the content number is
extremely large, the MOAC takes a very long time to get the
caching placement results, which has limited significance in
practical scenarios. In this section, we propose a simplified
caching placement algorithm with low complexity.
Since the popularity of the contents in the mobile networks
follows the Zipf distribution [43], only a small portion of
the content chunks are quested by most of the UTs in a
cell. Obviously, it is only necessary to auction high-popularity
contents and ignore low-popularity ones. Therefore, we pro-
pose a heuristic MRAC based on the popularity of content
chunks. In the proposed MRAC, the content chunks are sorted
according to the local popularity of the contents in one cell,
then the content chunks are auctioned one by one from the
highest popularity until no UT in the cell is willing to continue
participating in the auctions.
First, the local popularity Fm =
N∑
n=1
f(m)n
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
f
(m)
n
of chunk m
is calculated according to f
(m)
n . Then the content chunks are
ranked according to Fm from highest to lowest. The most
popular content chunk is denoted as 1, and the content chunk
with popularity i is denoted as i, 1 ≤ i ≤ M . The auction
starts from the most popular content chunk one by one. Since
each UT can only cache one content chunk, UT n will not
participate in the next round auction if its cache space has
been occupied. In the ith round auction, the participant UTs
is defined as n ∈ L(i), then the caching placement problem as
follows,
max
x(i)
N∑
n=1
v(i)n x
(i)
n (18a)
s.t. x(i)n + x
(i)
n′ ≤ 1, ∀n, n′ if En,n′ = 1, (18b)
x(i)n = {0, 1} , n ∈ L(i), (18c)
where (18b) denotes the “cache conflict” restrict relationship
of UT n and UT n′, and (18c) constrains that x(i)n is a binary
variable. In fact, problem (18) can be regarded as a special
case of problem (10) with M = 1. The process of MRAC is
given in Algorithm 2.
We compare the proposed Algorithm 1 (MOAC) and Algo-
rithm 2 (MRAC) in Fig. 2. MOAC auctions all the contents for
all the UTs by one time auction, which gives the near optimal
caching placement solution. In contrast, MRAC auctions the
contents one by one and the final caching placement solution
is obtained after multiple auctions. MRAC can be seen as
a simplified algorithm of MOAC since the problem (18) of
MRAC is a special case of problem (10) when M = 1. The
complexity of MRAC is much lower than that of MOAC.
In MRAC, we only need to solve the problem over S with
9Algorithm 2 MRAC algorithm
1: - Step 1: Initialization
2: Rank the content chunks according to the local popularity
Fm from the highest to the lowest, and the content chunk with
popularity i is denoted as i, 1 ≤ i ≤M ;
3: - Step 2: content chunk i auction process
4: In the ith round of auction, obtain the winner set N (i) and
caching placement for the content chunk i from the solution of
problem (18);
5: Determine the price of content chunk i using the pric-
ing payment strategy described in (15)-(16), the price p(i) =
[p
(i)
1 , p
(i)
2 , ..., p
(i)
N ]
T based on Nash bargaining game is obtained.
6: Move the winner set N (i) out from the UTs set, and the
participant UTs set of (i+ 1)th round is L(i+1) = N\
i∑
j=1
N (j).
7: - Step 3: Judgement
8: if L(i+1) is not an empty set then
9: i = i+ 1;
10: Goto Step 2;
11: else
12: End of the algorithm;
13: end if
Fig. 2: Comparison of MOAC and MRAC algorithms.
degrees of 12N(N + 1) in every round of auction. Due to
the limited UTs cache spaces, the number of auction rounds
based on content chunks popularity rankings is limited and
does not increase as the number of content increases. So
we can consider the computational complexity reduced from
O(M2N2) to O(N2).
Remark 3. MOAC and MRAC get similar performance under
the condition that the popularity of content chunks are Zipf
distribution but the algorithm complexity of MRAC is very low.
In MRAC, the most important UTs will cache the most popular
content chunks, which is consistent with the initial goal of
caching placement in MOAC. The performance gap between
MRAC and MOAC is very small. Simulation results also show
that, MRAC gets 98% caching performance of MOAC while
the calculation time of MRAC is greatly reduced with larger
number of UTs. So we can apply MRAC in the practical edge
caching in D2D cellular networks.
In order to implement the proposed MOAC and MRAC
algorithms, it is a feasible solution to make a centralized agent
entity with powerful computation ability, such as a functional
entity deployed in the macro BS, to host the auction for content
caching UTs and other cache management function, such as
the cache update function and cache consistency maintenance
function2. In this way, the mobile users can report the control
information, such as, the encounter probability between UTs,
and the average transmission rate between UTs, to this cen-
tralized agent entity. Based on the proposed auction model,
we formulate the optimization problem and seek for an upper
bound for the content caching placement. The computational
complexity of the suboptimal solution is high for individual
UT.
Since we assume that there is a centralized agent entity
for cache management, it is nature to implement the cache
consistency maintenance in this centralized agent entity. Some
state-of-art cache consistency maintenance algorithms have
been proposed for wireless mobile environments, such as [44].
The centralized agent entity records all cached contents for
each UT. When the cached contents are expiration during
UTs’ movement, it sends an invalidation report (IR) to that
particular UT. The cache consistency maintenance is out of
the scope of this paper. Meanwhile, the proposed algorithms
are periodically executed in a predefined time interval, such
as, one hour or one day. Consequently, the cache of UT can
be updated under the control of the centralized agent entity.
In this paper, besides the general control overhead for D2D
communications in cellular networks, the control overhead of
the proposed algorithms is mainly derived from the submission
of the UTs bids during the auction and delivery the auction
results to the UTs according to the proposed algorithms.
Therefore, our control overhead is proportional to the number
of UTs participating in the auction. Since the information
exchange between the centralized agent entity and the UTs
occurs in the off-peak period, the performance impact on the
peak period can be negligible compared to the calculation cost
of the centralized agent entity.
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, the system performance of the proposed
caching placement algorithms are verified by Matlab simu-
lation.
A. Simulation Settings
In the simulation, a macro BS is deployed at the center
of the cell and N UTs are randomly distributed in the cell
2In a dynamic network with user movements, a learning based distributed
caching placement algorithm may be more feasible in practical scenarios.
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and can communicate with any neighbor UTs in within the
coverage. The clustered random model is used to model the
UTs’ movement in the macrocell with a coverage radius R.
We assume that there are C clusters within this coverage,
and the radius of the middle point of each cluster is 30 m.
We assume that there are H home-points distributed within
the radius of each cluster, and each home-point is shared
by nh UTs. Therefore, the number of UTs in our simulated
cellular network is N = CHnh. In the simulation, the
parameter setting used for D2D communication is from the
Technical Report of 3GPP [45], the system bandwidth of D2D
communication is 10 MHz uplink and 10 MHz downlink for
FDD, and the indoor to indoor channel model is as defined
in [45], including the pathloss, shadowing, and the fast fading.
The detailed simulation parameters are given in Table II.
TABLE II: Simulation Parameters
Parameter Value
Carrier frequency 2 GHz
Radio bandwidth 20 MHz
Backhaul data rate 1.5 Mbps
D2D transmit power P txn′ 23 dBm
BS transmit power P txBS 43 dBm
Pathloss from BS to UT 37.6log10(d[km])+128.1 dB
Pathloss of D2D channel 40log10(d[km])+148 dB
Noise power spectral density -174 dBm/Hz
K -50 dBm
ϑ 10−6
ζ 1
The popularity of M contents follows a Zipf -like distribu-
tion [43] with parameter α. When the contents are indexed in
descending order of popularity, the popularity probability of
the mth content is
pm = m
−α/
M∑
j=1
j−α, (19)
the popularity distribution is more skewed with larger α. The
size of each content chunk s is set to one M bytes. We use
f
(m)
n to model the data request of UT n for the content m,
which is assumed to be a constant during the UT movement.
For UT n, we assume that
M∑
m=1
f
(m)
n = 1. The BS makes the
caching placement decision with the statistical knowledge of
content preference and movement position of UTs.
B. Simulation Results
We first demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
MOAC with SDP relaxation. We set C = 2 and vary N from
10 to 40. It can be seen from our previous discussion that
the value of encounter probability threshold γ is related to
the encounter probabilities between UTs, which determines
the “cache conflict” matrix and also affects the optimality of
our SDP relaxation. Therefore, γ should choose an appro-
priate value according to the distribution of the encounter
probabilities between UTs. In Fig. 3, we demonstrate the
encounter probabilities between UTs in the same cluster with
BS coverage radius of 150 m, 250 m and 350 m. Obviously, the
smaller the coverage radius of the BS is, the higher mean value
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Fig. 3: Cumulative distribution of the encounter probabilities.
of the encounter probabilities is. The cumulative distribution
results also show that, within the same size coverage, the
encounter probability between two specific UTs in the same
cluster will be concentrated in a certain span of about 0.2.
Based on this statistical result, we choose the mean value of
in-cluster encounter probabilities emean as the value of γ,
emean =
1
C
C∑
c=1
1
|ec|
∑
en,n′∈ec
en,n′ , (20)
where ec denotes the encounter probabilities matrix between
UTs within cluster c and |ec| denotes the number of encounter
probabilities in ec. In this case, the value of γ is variable de-
pending on the BS coverage radius and UTs movement model.
In Fig. 4, when we take γ = emean, the caching placement
obtained by MOAC is compared with the optimal caching
placement obtained from the exhaustive search method with
1000 rounds of calculations for varying UT numbers. The ratio
of solutions obtained by MOAC with SDP relaxation to the
optimal solutions by exhaustive search is always above 99%,
which demonstrates the Remark 2 we have provided in section
III. Therefore, it can be seen that the proposed MOAC based
on SDP relaxation is feasible and effective.
Then we compare the performance of MOAC and MRAC in
terms of social welfare value and calculation time complexity.
Because MRAC sorts and auctions content chunks according
to the popularity, we consider the influence of the zipf dis-
tribution parameter of the content chunks popularity on the
performance of MOAC and MRAC in the simulation. Fig. 5
compares the social welfare values of MOAC and MRAC
when the number of UTs is 10, 15 and 20 respectively. The
social welfare value of MRAC is almost the same as that of
MOAC in the three cases, with only 2% difference. As the
zipf distribution parameter increases from 0.1 to 1, the average
social welfare value ratio of MRAC to MOAC decreases from
99.41% to 99.16%, which means that the zipf distribution
parameter has little effect on the performance gap between
MRAC and MOAC. Fig. 6 compares the calculation time
of MOAC and MRAC with 4 content chunks and 8 content
chunks. The simulation results show that, i) when the number
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of content chunks increases form 4 to 8, the calculation time
of MOAC increases sharply, in contrast, the calculation time
of MRAC increases mildly; ii) the calculation time of MOAC
increases quickly with the increasing of UT numbers, but that
of MRAC has little changes. Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 demonstrate
the Remark 3 we have provided in section IV. Therefore, the
proposed MRAC is more feasible in the practical scenario with
a large number of contents.
Next, we compare the caching performance of the proposed
MRAC with the social-aware caching game (SAGG) [26] and
random caching (RC). The criteria of the caching performance
considered in this paper are average content access delay and
the BS traffic offloading ratio. In the simulation results, the
average content access delay of N UTs for M chunks is
D = En
{
M∑
m=1
f (m)n
[
s
rminn,n′
θ +
(
s
rn,BS
+
s
rback
)
(1− θ)
]}
(21)
where rminn,n′ denotes the minimum data rate of D2D commu-
nication between UT n and n′ (n′ ∈ N (m)n and N (m)n =
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{n′|x(m)n′ = 1, n′ ∈ Nn} during the content delivery, rback
denotes the data rate of the backhaul link of the BS and θ = 1
if Nd 6= ∅, which means that chunk m is shared by D2D
communication in the cell, else θ = 0, which is the case of BS
transmission. En indicates the average access time for all UTs
to obtain all their required chunks. The BS traffic offloading
ratio is calculated as
O =
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
f
(m)
n x
(m)
n
M∑
m=1
N∑
n=1
f
(m)
n
. (22)
The larger value of O means more traffic are delivered by
D2D communications.
In the simulation, we assume that coverage radius R =
250 m, the number of UTs N = 40, and the zipf distribution
parameter α = 1. We simulate the performance of MRAC
when γ is equal to 0, 1 and emean, respectively. As we
discussed before, when γ = 1, there is no “cache conflict”
between the UTs, which will cause almost all UTs to cache the
same most popular chunk. When γ = 0, the “cache conflict”
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Fig. 8: BS traffic offloading ratio comparison with varying
number of content chunks.
condition between UTs is very strict, that is, only one chunk
can be cached in the entire macrocell region regardless of
whether there is D2D communication capability between UTs.
Fig. 7 compares the average content access delay for differ-
ent numbers of content chunks. As shown in Fig. 7, no matter
which algorithm is used for proactive caching at off-peak
hours, the average content access delay for content delivery
during peak hours can be reduced since the average content
access delay by the BS transmission without caching during
the peak period is 6.3 s in our simulation. When γ = 1, as
the number of chunks increases, the average content access
delay of MRAC increases rapidly, which is gradually higher
than SACG and close to RC. When γ = 0, the average
content access delay of MRAC is very close to SACG. When
γ = emean, the average content access delay of MRAC can
be significantly reduced. When the number of contents reaches
50, the average content access delay of MRAC is 79.46% and
58.81% of RC and SACG, respectively. From Fig. 8, when
γ = emean, MRAC can effectively reduce the traffic load
of the BS during peak hours. When the number of contents
reaches 50, MRAC’s BS traffic offloading is about 4.02 times
and 1.31 times of RC and SACG, respectively. Since the
cache space is limited, the BS traffic offloading decreases
as the number of content chunks increases. Similar as the
performance of average content access delay, when γ = 1
and 0, the BS traffic offloading performance of MRAC is
close to RC and SACG, respectively. The results of Fig. 7
and Fig. 8 verify that the proposed MRAC can effectively
reduce the average content access delay of the UTs and the
traffic load of the BS in peak hours, which demonstrates the
Remark 1 we provided in section III.
Finally, we consider the impact of the zipf distribution
parameter α on the performance of the caching placement
algorithms. We set M = 30, N = 40, and vary α from 0.6
to 1.4. As shown in Fig. 9 and Fig. 10, as α increases, the
average content access delay of MRAC decreases from 4.27s
to 2.23s, and the BS offloading ratio increases from 46.37%
to 84.24%. It can be seen from the simulation results that
the proposed algorithm achieves better performance when the
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Fig. 9: Average content access delay comparison with varying
zipf distribution parameter.
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Fig. 10: BS traffic offloading ratio with varying zipf distribu-
tion parameter.
content popularity is more concentrated in the case of limited
cache space of UTs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the UT edge caching
in D2D-enabled caching cellular networks. The multi-winner
auction for caching placement has been formulated. Based on
which, a near optimal MOAC algorithm and a low-complexity
MRAC algorithm have been proposed. It was demonstrated
that the proposed algorithms solving the problem of user
selfishness through the natural social efficiency and individual
rationality of the proposed auction model. Based on the user’s
preferences and the “cache conflict” restrict relationship of the
UTs, the proposed algorithms have selected different indepen-
dent UT sets to cache different contents, which effectively
avoids the waste of cache space. The feasible and effective of
the proposed algorithms have been verified by the simulation
results. In our future work, we try to optimize the radio
resource allocation and caching placement jointly in a dynamic
network with the aid of deep learning method.
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APPENDIX A: PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. We assume the sets W and V , that if and only if χ∗n 6=
0, n ∈ W∗. Similarly, if and only if y∗n 6= 0 , n ∈ V∗. For
the binary variable χn , the constraint χn+χn′ ≤ 1 can also
be expressed as χnχn′ = 0. We define yn =
√
υnχn√∑
k∈W∗
υk
and
|y|2 = 1 on the basis of χn, and for any UT n, n′, if En,n′ =
1, then ynyn′ =
√
υnυn′∑
k∈W∗ υk
χnχn′ = 0. y
∗ that satisfies the
above constraints can be considered as a reasonable solution.
Since U˜∗ is the maximum value and |y|2 = 1, we know that,
U˜∗ ≥ (µTy)2 = (
∑
n∈W∗ υn√∑
k∈W∗ υk
)2 =
∑
n∈W∗
υn = U
∗ (D.1)
At the same time, because y∗ is the optimal solution
of problem (13), we can express (13) equivalently as the
following problem about the set V ,
max
yn,n∈V∗
(
∑
n∈V∗
√
υnyn)
2,
s.t.
∑
n∈V∗
(yn)
2 = 1.
(D.2)
According to the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality,
(
∑
n∈V∗
√
υnyn)
2 ≤ ( ∑
n∈V∗
υn)[
∑
n∈V∗
(υn)
2
] =
∑
n∈V∗
υn is
obtained, and when y∗n = c
√
υn , the equation holds. Since if
En,n′ = 1 , y
∗
ny
∗
n′ =
√
υnυn′∑
k∈W∗
υk
χ∗nχ∗n′ = 0 , we know that
V meets the user’s no cache conflict condition, so we can
conclude that,
U˜∗ =
∑
n∈V∗
vn ≤ U∗ (D.3)
Comparing (D.1) and (D.3), we can see that Lemma 1 has
been proved.
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